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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
peace as contrasted with the cynical or indifferent scepticism of i99
are equivalent marvels. More overwhelming proof of the necessity
and value of the League idea it would be impossible to imagine...
"Prophecy is no part of my task; but one prediction is safe.
American membership in the League is merely a question of the
existence of the League; the one involves the other. If the League
goes on, we join. The time is uncertain, but with no less certainty
of the fact; and a future generation of Americans will look back at
the utterances of alleged 'saviours' of the country with the same
amused and contemptuous incredulity as ours when we read of those
other 'statesmen' of the time of Grant who said that the Red Cross
was surely contrary to the Monroe Doctrine...
"No one could suggest, and certainly I would be the last to do so,
that the Covenant is even approximately a finality. On the contrary,
I would say that one of the chief merits of the Covenant is that it
does not attempt finality. Written for the world that is, and not
seeking eternal wihdom, it has in its words and in its spirit the
promise of betterment hereafter."
The second volume which is decidedly the larger of the two,
containing 830 pages of text, is entirely devoted to documents bearing
upon the drafting of the Covenant. Here we have brought together
very important source material for the student and the historian.
The value of this material is, however, greatly enhanced by the
wealth of Mr. Miller's notes and comments which fill his first volume.
Cornell Law School Charles K. Burdick.
Aviation Law. By HENRY G. HOTCHKISs. New York: Baker,
Voorhis & Company. 1928. pp. xvii, 492.
Mr. Hotchkiss is one of the editors of the recently founded United
States Aviation Reports and also a member of a firm which has been
adviser to an important corporation engaged in the development of
civil aeronautics. He therefore brings to the task of preparing a text
on the law of the air both wide knowledge of the literature ind
adequate appreciation of the practical business problems involved.
The book has two parts-the first quarter of its bulk being given
over to a condensed discussion of pertinent questions of law and the
remaining three-quarters consisting of an appendix containing the
international convention of 1919, the Havana convention of 1928,
the federal statutes and regulations, and the state laws. This latter
section is in large degree found also in volume one of United States
Aviation Reports. It forms a very convenient collection of American
legislation on aeronautics. Neither English, Canadian, or continental
statutes or treaties are inserted.
In the earlier portion of the book the main topics of aviation law
are' treated; as, for example, international law questions, space
ownership, tort liability, aircraft standards and rules of the road,
insurance, workmen's compensation, common carrier law, constitu-
tional questions, and admiralty, patent and criminal law problems.
The author refers to and briefly discusses many of the articles on
air law, but has not attempted to make his list complete. For
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example, none of the nine notes and articles mentioned in the Index
to Legal Periodicals for 1926 as having been- published in that year,
are found in Mr. Hotchkiss's list of authorities cited. In this group
of omitted papers is the valuable article by Mr. F. P. Lee, legislative
counsel for the United States Senate, in which he analyzes the
Federal Air Commerce Act of 1926. Major Jefferson Davis's nu-
merous monographs on the topic are also missing.
The author's presentation of facts and arguments about the sub-
stantive law of flight is in the main clear and accurate but extremely
brief. If any criticism could be made one might urge that, in his
eagerness to see the law develop in such a way as to encourage the
growing civil aeronautics industry, Mr. Hotchkiss tends to neglect
the rights, powers, privileges, and immunities of the groundsmen.
Indeed, he expressly states' that "the spread of aviation will more and
more establish rights of flight that encroach upon the rights of others
judged by preaviation standards." The social interest in the de-
velopment of aerial navigation is great, but there would seem to be
no doubt that the safety, comfort, and convenience of the citizens
who live and do business on the ground always will be many times
more important. In the early flush of enthusiasm over a spectacular
and useful new means of travel we should not neglect the grounds-
man's property rights in the space over his soil or the rights of the
general public to protection against the annoyances and dangers
which aeronautics occasionally produce for those below. Both in
his treatment of space ownership and the right of flight and in his
discussion of the liability of the aviator for damage to persons and
property on the surface, Mr. Hotchldss seems slightly too favorable
to the aviator and the aircraft. He argues against the rule of the
English Act and of the Uniform Act which places upon the owner of the
aircraft absolute liability for damage to persons or property on the
ground occasioned by the descent of the aircraft. He would require
proof of intentional injury or negligence. To the writer the helpless-
ness of the groundsman to prevent damage from the sky and the
usual impossibility of making proof of the cause of the crash are ade-
quate reasons for the rule of absolute liability. This principle has no
corresponding application to damage to passengers or freight in air-
craft, because there the doctrine of assumption of risk may be said
to apply.
In referring to the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics it would
seem that Mr. Hotchkiss should at some point have given a slight
account of the origin of the act, by way of brief reference to the
Conference which prepared it, the method of its drafting, and the
approval of it by the American Bar Association. The Uniform State
Air Licensing Act, a draft of which was published before this book,
might also have been mentioned in connection with the statement2
of the desirability of state regulation of aviation in harmony with
federal legislation. The object of this last named uniform act is in
substance to put the federal rules into effect in the states as state rules.
'P. 30. 2p. 51.
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The general accuracy of the work is marred by a few minor mis-
takes, as where Mr. William Velpeau Rooker of Indianapolis is
referred to as "Mr. Rocker,"3 and in the error in quoting section 4 of
the Uniform State Law for Aeronautics. 4
The defects mentioned are relatively unimportant. The treatise
will be very useful to practitioners, business men, and teachers. It
will doubtless have an appreciable influence on the growth of the law
in this new field. This book, the United States Aviation Reports,
and the government bulletin on legal problems connected with civil
aeronautics now constitute together a rather complete library of
source material on this new branch of American law.
The University of Chicago Law School George G. Bogert.
Fundamentals of the Law of Proof in Judicial Proceedings. By OTIS
H. FISK. Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Company. 1928.
pp. 217.
"There is no sense at all in the legal profession's continuing
to flounder in the morass of confusion in the law of proof.
Instead of finding our way out, we have been getting in deeper
and deeper. With characteristic Anglo-Saxon aversion or
indifference to analysis (or are we racially incapable of such
analysis?), proneness to the practicability of things," dislike for
theorizing, and worship of precedent, we continue to pile up
irreconcilable decisions and notions about the institutes of the
law of proof .... The first step in getting back to the funda-
mentals of the law of proof is, to search the primary institutes
of that law. When they are found, the second step is, to name
and define them clearly. The third step is, to determine their
proper correlations-in other words to systematize the funda-
mentals. . . . My analysis starts with the separation of the
Substantive Law and the Remedial Law. The nature and place
of Assumptions are also determined. Then comes the analysis
of the law of proof, the main theme. That analysis begins with
a dissection of the institute called the Burden of Proof, which
results in the discovery of the other primary institutes of the
Law of Proof, called Judicial Admissions, Judicial Notice,
Evidence, and Presumptions. Then these institutes are taken
up and their fundamental functions are described in detail. A
chapter is devoted to each of them except Evidence, which
does not require such treatment for the purpose in hand. An
appendix gives a sketch of Presumptions in the Roman System
of Law .... "
Thus the author in his preface describes the little book which he
has dedicated to "Clarity in, the Law." Any attempt to rationalize
the law of Evidence is bound to receive instant attention, but can
hardly expect instant approval. Many will at once object to the
suggestion that in this field we should place less emphasis upon "the
3P. 67. 4p. 31.
,Italics are the reviewer's.
